Thursday, August 06, 2009

Stuart Kauffman on the Philosophy of Mind

This was posted at the MIT Technology Review blog - interesting argument on mind from a biologist. This is essentially a review of a recent article by Kauffman, which I am looking forward to reading.

Kauffman on the Philosophy of Mind

The theoretical biologist, Stuart Kauffman, argues that quantum physics can explain the existence of free will.

Stuart Kauffman is a theoretical biologist and author from the University of Calgary in Canada who has pioneered the study of complexity in relation to biological systems.

As a theoretical biologist, it must be hard to avoid the biggest outstanding problem of them all: what is the nature of consciousness? And today, Kauffman takes a crack at it along with five others related to the philosophy of mind.

He begins by mapping out his territory: "If mind depends upon the specific physics of the mind-brains system, mind is, in part, a matter for physicists." Fair enough.

He then lists the questions he hopes to tackle:

  1. How does mind act on matter?

  2. If mind does not act on matter is mind a mere epiphenomenon?

  3. What might be the source of free will?

  4. What might be the source of a responsible free will?

  5. Why might it have been selectively advantageous to evolve consciousness?

  6. What "is" consciousness?

That's an ambitious list. The gist of his answers is that mind is a quantum phenomenon that produces a classical output that Kauffman says is the source of free will. He adds that this classical output is nonrandom and yet cannot be described by the laws of physics because, as the quantum system decoheres, information is lost in a way that can never be retrieved.

If true, that's important because "if the quantum-classical boundary can be non-random yet lawless, then no algorithmic simulation of the world or ourselves can calculate the real world, hence the evolutionary selective advantages for evolving consciousness to "know" it may be great".

In other words, consciousness is very useful for making sense of the world which is why evolution selects for it.

He also says this means we are not machines, although how he reaches this conclusion isn't clear. A more reasonable conclusion would be that we are machines that span the quantum-classical divide.

In any case, that clears up questions 1 to 5.

As for the biggie, he says: "I make no progress on problem 6"

An honest answer for sure; but then why include it in the essay in the first place?

Ref: arxiv.org/abs/0907.2494: Physics and Five Problems in the Philosophy of Mind


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